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Abstract
Qianzhuang is the traditional bank born in China. During 
the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, plenty of 
historical data proves that Qianzhuang has always been 
a true financial service provider for Chinese agribusiness 
and commercial households. The control of deposit and 
loan risk in Qianzhuang is a concentrated expression of the 
localization advantages of Qianzhuang, and it still has a 
strong enlightenment for the risk control of contemporary 
financial institutions. This paper elaborates the risk 
control mechanism of Qianzhuang by explaining the risk 
control of Qianzhuang credit loan and the prevention 
mechanism of the credit risk, and further discusses the 
effectiveness of the risk control in Qianzhuang. Money 
Industry Association was built mainly to resist industrial 
risk. So there also is a discussion about Money Industry 
Association’s function to resist industrial risk.
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1 .   T H E  M A I N  F U N C T I O N S  A N D 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
QIANZHUANG
From the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, from 
townships and cities to the general public, Qianzhuang 
was everywhere, and played an important role in the 
social economy and the modernization of China’s industry 
and commerce.1 Through the financial exchanges between 
Qianzhuang and Qianzhuang, Qianzhuang and Piaohao 
, Qianzhuang and domestic and foreign banks, a huge 
financial network was established to communicate 
cross-regional trade and foreign trade. As we can see, 
Qianzhuang is one of the most representative forms of 
business development in China’s financial industry. It 
plays an indispensable role in the history of finance and 
even economic history, as well as the transition from 
traditional economy to modernization.
The internal organization structure of Qianzhuang 
is following the figure 1: eight butlers structure 
. Apart from the manager and manager’s associates, other 
staff members’ positions are based on the “eight butlers”.
Supervisor — Manager —
Associates 
 Accountant 
Salesman 
Financial Marketer 
Cashier 
Exchange Manager 
Interbank Manager 
Clerical staff 
Receptionists 
Apprentic
e 
Figure 1
Eight Butlers Structure
Every position in the “eight butlers” is ranked 
according to its importance to Qianzhuang, so the 
1 “Qing Gao Zong Shi Lu”, Volume 165, Qianlong seven years 
in April. This was the official literature for the first time to record 
Qianzhuang. It says: the shopkeepers are different, the government 
should check out how many shopkeepers and Qianzhuang for every 
territory, and list as a book. 
WANG Yanfen (2017). 
International Business and Management, 14(3), 38-47
39 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
order of their positions is slightly different for different 
Qianzhuang. Qianzhuang in short supply relies on 
interbank manager lending money. Rich Qianzhuang 
ranks salesman first to expand business, while interbank 
manager and accountant rank second and third. So the 
specific arrangement totally depends on the business 
strategy.
Within Qianzhuang, the manager has great power and 
is the highest decision maker, the manager is responsible 
for all the daily trifles, transactions and staff transfers. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the sustainable operation 
of the Qianzhuang, shareholders should first carefully 
select a qualified manager, and then give him the greatest 
trust. At the meantime, in order to ensure the interests 
of shareholders, some shareholders appoint supervisors 
to supervise the manager’s work, so as to report to 
shareholders at any time. Besides, there are several 
associates assisting manager.
In addition, from apprentice to manager, the number 
of employees in each position is uncertain, all employees 
are shifting according to business scale and business 
focus. Staffs are mostly employed by shareholders or 
recommended by managers. 
Such an organizational structure can not only maintain 
the authority of management, effectively implement 
policies and guidelines, but also could flexibly adjust 
to specific business with strong adaptability. There are 
not only checks and balances between the same level, 
but also supervisory constraints between the upper and 
lower levels, which enhance the ability of enterprises to 
withstand risks.
2 .   T H E  R I S K  C O N T R O L  O F 
QIANZHUANG CREDIT LOANS
2.1  The Objective Existence of Credit Loan for 
the Local Business
The Qianzhuang loans are mainly credit loans, merely 
mortgages, as they have always been since Qianzhuang 
was founded. 
This is because credit loans are mostly needed for 
the local business. First, in modern China, agricultural 
economy was the main economy, every year, a large 
number of agricultural products would be purchased, 
processed and trafficked, which requires a large amount 
of funds, but those business dealers could not provide 
collateral. Second, traditional commerce in China are 
not industrialized as the West, fixed assets investment is 
rare in businesses, but liquidity accounts for the majority, 
so it’s hard to mortgage. Third, even for some modern 
factories, the capital invested by entrepreneurs is often 
only used for the purchase of fixed assets, while liquidity 
relies on borrowing, and even some enterprises rely on 
borrowing when purchasing fixed assets, so it is rare to 
have enough collateral.
The lending business of Qianzhuang is entirely based 
on credit, which seems to be very risky. In fact, there 
exists an implicit and effective risk control mechanism. 
The risk control of modern banks pays special attention 
to objective data, the most typical example is financial 
information, so the modern risk control investigation 
must check the accounts of credit granting enterprises. 
However, for Qianzhuang in the traditional banking 
industry, no auditing is allowed. The fact that Qianzhuang 
do not check accounts is not that credit-granting 
enterprises do not have accounts to check. Traditional 
firms, of course, own their traditional accounting, which 
is also very meticulous.
However, the current capital situation of Chinese 
traditional firms is very liquid. For example, Chinese 
traditional firms always carry out unlimited risk liability. 
There are two kinds of own funds, one is the equity 
capital, the other is the demand deposit in firm deposited 
by shareholders, which is called copy or passport. Because 
shareholders often own many firms, their deposits in one 
firm are often variable. For example, to withdraw from 
No. A, or withdraw from No. C, deposit into No. B, as a 
relief fund to help No. B who is insufficient. Moreover, 
if a firm is facing a broken capital chain, with poor 
liquidity, or debt crisis, shareholders will take unlimited 
risk responsibility to ensure the interests of creditors with 
all their capital strength outside Qianzhuang. Not only 
that, when necessary, shareholders can also use their own 
commercial credit to mobilize capital from the social 
network to maintain the credit of their business.
Therefore, for the risk control of the granting capital 
to Qianzhuang, there is no practical significance to just 
check the accounts of one firm. However, Qianzhuang 
still check the details of their businesses, mainly depends 
on checking their credit.
2.2  Credit Investigation by “Street Running”2 
Chinese society has already formed the credit economic 
operation rules which is suitable for credit loan. It is 
said that since the middle ages, the rise of Commerce 
in the West has been adapted to the rise of civil and 
commercial law. In China, up to the end of the Qing 
Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China, there 
was basically no civil and commercial law, but Chinese 
have developed adequate commercial contacts depended 
on credit. The credit lending of Qianzhuang operates 
on the track of this credit economy. Credit survey is the 
most important thing for Qianzhuang to lend money. 
Generally, the investigation contents include: the assets 
of the shareholders, the morality and management ability 
of the managers, the market conditions and prospects of 
the invested projects. Even the private life of shareholders 
2 “street running” is the position of salesman in the “eight butlers” 
structure
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and managers belongs to the scope of investigation.
The accuracy of investigating information is largely 
related to the geographic relationship and human relations 
between Qianzhuang and firms. Qianzhuang usually have 
a special position called “street running” (the position of 
salesman in the “eight butlers” structure). As the name 
implies, it means that every day they go to the streets to 
have extensive contacts with customers and their business 
associations, and to explore everywhere. In fact, it is 
equivalent to the current credit investigators. According to 
the situation of the merchants, the situation of the whole 
business group and even the industry, and according to the 
situation of the business group to estimate the business 
situation of customers. This is something that Western 
banks don’t have. Their research method is not the current 
audit. Running the streets never checks the accounts of 
credit enterprises. It’s a kind of non-standard research.
In traditional society, for every city and every 
profession, there will be an informal gathering place, like 
tea house. Businessmen in the same industry no matter 
they have something to do or not, just gather in a fixed 
tea house, exchange information and discuss business. 
The running street of Qianzhuang specializes in this 
teahouse, making friends with businessmen and listening 
for information. As time goes by, they will have a clear 
understanding of those businessmen’s characters, capital 
strength, current business and current situation. Then they 
will return to report to the manager of Qianzhuang, and 
the manager will decide whether to loan money to them or 
not.
Running street is often the most important functional 
department in a standard Qianzhuang. Qianzhuang in 
small towns are totally involved into the local network, 
while those in big cities often deal with specific 
commercial group, such as Qianzhuang in Hankou, which 
have several different groups and do not compete with 
each other, because Qianzhuang of each commercial 
group mainly deal with their own businesses in Hankou. 
Another big city, Shanghai, every Qianzhuang’s Street 
runner will focus on several industries and established 
business associations. This kind of special network leads 
to the thoroughly informing about merchants. Although 
it is not quantitative, but it is more comprehensive, more 
perceptual and more accurate. No matter foreign banks 
or domestic banks that imitated the western system in 
the early stage, they had neither the habit of in-depth 
investigation nor the pipeline of in-depth regional business 
relationship network, so they could not directly contact 
local customers and provide financial services. That’s 
the main reason why they can’t lend directly to Chinese 
businessmen.
2.3  Business Circles Attach Importance to 
Commercial Credit
In the whole business circle, businessmen extremely 
value their commercial credit, their credit is their second 
life. “A promise is weightier than one thousand bars of 
gold”, which is often regarded as a basis morality, in 
traditional society, such morality does exist widely. But 
in fact, once this habit is formed, it will form an effective 
exile mechanism. With good credit, even if business 
is in danger, some people are willing to help, even if 
business fails, credit is not lost, there are opportunities 
for a comeback. On the contrary, with bad credit, it will 
be resisted by the others, every business move is difficult. 
Therefore, in traditional business circles, credit is not only 
a kind of morality, but also a kind of practical latent rules. 
It is no less effective than the law of the West.
The loans of a Qianzhuang are credit loans, and the 
risk control of credit loan mainly depends on the credit 
of the debtor. The so-called business credit does not have 
a normative definition. Generally speaking, it should 
include three aspects and three levels:
First is the objective aspect, which is the firm owner’s 
capital strength and property. As mentioned earlier, 
Chinese firms have always implemented an unlimited risk 
liability system. Therefore, whether a firm can afford to 
pay its debts does not depend on the capital of the firm 
itself, but on the capital strength of its shareholders.
Second is the subjective aspect, which is the moral 
conduct of the boss, because the loan is assumed 
according to unlimited risk liability, and how much capital 
the firm and its shareholders have, loaners can only 
have a rough knowledge, if the shareholders go back on 
their words, it is difficult to chase back, so whether the 
shareholders are trustworthy matters a lot.
The third aspect is between subjective and objective. 
It’s the social network of shareholders. This kind of 
network generally refers to the relatives, friends and 
customers of shareholders. Shareholders have the ability 
to accommodate capital in their personal relationships. 
On the one hand, the greater the capital power of 
shareholders, the more friends, the richer friends. On the 
other hand, the more credible the shareholders are, the 
more righteous the friends are. Therefore, the networked 
shareholders, even without using their own assets, can 
also get enough capital only by their friends.
Credit, in a deep sense, is the key element for Chinese 
business circles. This is a Chinese ancient cultural 
tradition, if a person has god virtue and credit, then his 
personality is recognized by the society, he will easily 
accumulate network contacts. If he gets contacts, he will 
easily grasp business organizations and get more business 
opportunities. With business opportunities and talents 
available, he will naturally easily accumulate money. 
Therefore, in the traditional business circle, businessmen 
attach great importance to commercial credit, credit is 
the largest capital. A person’s capital has been lost, but if 
he maintains his credit, there is still a chance to make a 
comeback. If you lose your credit, you have no chance. 
Therefore, the most important risk control of bank lending 
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is actually to see the credit of a business shareholder in 
the business circle.
Credit could decide one’s career, so when businessmen 
loan, they rarely default, for fear of losing their credit. But 
what if someone defaults? How to check and balance? 
In traditional society, there is no developed commercial 
law system as in the West. Government for those who do 
not pay their debts, of course, will give creditors strong 
support. However, in China’s tradition, civil disputes have 
never been preferred to be settled by judicial means, but 
mainly by means of civil checks and balances. 
More commonly used, of course, is guarantees. This is 
mainly used when Qianzhuang doubts the creditworthiness 
of the debtors, but they still want to do this business, 
so how to control the risk of such people? They ask for 
a guarantee. For example, if A applies for a loan from 
Qianzhuang, but Qianzhuang does not know much about 
A’s credit, or has doubts about it, then A could make B as 
his guarantor to provide a guarantee to Qianzhuang for 
him. As long as Qianzhuang recognizes the credit of B, it 
is willing to lend money to A with unknown credit. If A 
fails to repay the debts in the future, the guarantor B may 
repay the debts on his behalf.
Is this kind of guarantee reliable? This depends on 
two points, one is whether the credit of the guarantor is 
reliable, the other is whether the guarantor is responsible 
for the borrower. In the former part, as we have already 
mentioned above, we mainly discuss the latter part, 
namely, the relationship between the guarantor and the 
guarantee. Between A and B, there is either a relationship 
of relative or friend, or business partner. A person who 
is closest to himself is naturally the most trustworthy. 
The farther the relationship is, the credit will naturally 
decline. So, A may be willing to default on Qianzhuang 
subjectively, but he is unwilling to do something to harm 
his guarantor (relatives or friends).
In Chinese society, relationship circles are very 
important. Take everybody as a core, then there is a 
semi-closed and semi-open circle of contacts. A person 
in business needs the help of friends in his circle. The 
relationship between businessmen and circles is like the 
relationship between fish and water. The businessman 
relies on his circle to survive and cannot live without it, 
then the circle will form a restrict to a person. The circle’s 
check and balance to the people in the circle seems very 
informal, but in fact it is very effective. The reason for 
this is the so-called “collective exile mechanism” raised 
by institutional economics.
The collective exile mechanism actually includes three 
interrelated keywords: semi-closed collective, monopoly 
profit and collective exile. A semi-closed collective 
monopolizes an industry, and outsiders can’t easily get in. 
Then it is easy to form monopoly profits. This means that 
members of the collective can share monopoly profits. 
Once one leaves the collective, the profits of business 
operations will be greatly reduced. On this basis, the 
collective will formulate some rules or hidden rules that 
members must abide by together to ensure collective 
interests. If members violate this rule, they will be resisted 
by the collective “non-violent non-cooperation”, and the 
members who violate the rules will be pushed out of the 
collective. This is collective exile. Members, taking into 
account the role of collective exile, will inevitably abide 
by the rules or hidden rules in the collective. Therefore, 
guarantees, because of collective exile mechanism, is very 
effective.
Above all, Qianzhuang’s credit loans, although not 
mortgaged, are rarely maliciously backed. The risks are 
not as great as bankers think.
3.  THE PREvENTIvE MECHANISM OF 
RUNNING RISK IN QIANZHUANG
During the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, 
taking Shanghai’s strongest Qianzhuang as an example, 
even for the first-class Qianzhuang, there may be only 
ten thousand silver capital and at most one hundred 
thousand silver capital. But the loan scale of Shanghai’s 
Qianzhuang is generally millions silver. On the other 
hand, stock capital of banks typically could reach for 
millions. Therefore, bankers believe that Qianzhuang have 
too little capital to deal with the runs, which is easy to 
produce bad debts, and could trigger a chain reaction, to 
endanger the financial order. 
Running is the direct cause of the bankruptcy of 
financial institutions in the past. It is also the direct 
result of the credit crisis. If depositors have doubts about 
the Qianzhuang’s credit, then withdrawing deposits 
simultaneously, and if Qianzhuang fails to pay cash 
in time, then Qianzhuang will be facing bankruptcy. 
There are three aspects in the conventional prevention 
mechanism of run risk: daily balance of income and 
expenditure, interbank lending and unlimited joint liability 
of shareholders.
3.1  Daily Balance of Income and Expenditure
In modern banking business, there is a basic concept 
called deposit reserve. That is to say, the bank must keep 
part of the cash in order to cope with the depositor’s daily 
withdrawal. Another concept called the deposit reserve 
ratio, which is the ratio of the amount of reserve to the 
amount of deposit deposited by the depositor. The larger 
the amount of deposit, the more cash must be prepared 
for withdrawal. The higher the reserve ratio is, the more 
insurable the withdrawal should be, but the cash stays at 
home without interest income. On the contrary, the more 
the loan is, the more the interest will be, but the less the 
reserve, the easier it will not be enough to withdraw. 
Banks will determine a rough reserve ratio based on their 
daily expenditure.
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In traditional Chinese Qianzhuang, there is no term for 
reserve and reserve ratio, but there are similar concepts. 
For example, Shanghai’s money industry has so-called 
concepts of multi-sheet and short-sheet.
The so-called multi-sheet means that Qianzhuang’s 
daily cash inflow (deposit) is greater than its cash outflow 
(withdrawal). The remaining cash can be borrowed 
overnight in the interbank lending market to other 
Qianzhuang. The so-called short-sheet, on the contrary, 
means that Qianzhuang’s daily cash inflow is less than the 
cash outflow, insufficient cash to pay for withdrawals, it 
is necessary to find other Qianzhuang to borrow money 
in the interbank lending market. Therefore, the interbank 
lending market provides a relative insurance. When some 
are short of money, the others would provide mutual 
support. This support is also a way of collective survival, 
because if one fails, it will often cause large-scale runs as 
a chain reaction.
3.2  Interbank Lending
In addition to interbank lending, Qianzhuang often borrow 
cash from larger financial institutions, such as Shanghai 
Qianzhuang borrow money from Shanxi Piaohao, or from 
foreign banks in Shanghai, or lately from major domestic 
banks. Which forms the pattern that the large financial 
institutions become financial wholesalers and Qianzhuang 
becomes a retailer. 
Qianzhuang in the second-tier cities, such as Jiujiang 
in Jiangxi, Wuhu in Anhui and Zhenjiang in Jiangsu, may 
borrow cash and banknotes from Qianzhuang in big cities 
such as Shanghai. The next-class Township Qianzhuang, 
such as those in Liyang of Jiangsu province, borrow 
money from Zhenjiang.
The manager and street runner of Qianzhuang have 
an important task, which is to establish long-term human 
relations with big Qianzhuang, Piaohao and banks, to 
acknowledge the tightness degree of money and interest 
rate fluctuations in the financial market, and to be ready 
to borrow more cash when the business is developing and 
the reserve is insufficient. Shanghai’s Qianzhuang is more 
professional. Three positions of eight butlers are doing 
this job, namely, Financial Marketer, Exchange Manager 
and Interbank Manager.
3.2.1  Unlimited Risk Liability of Shareholders3
Qianzhuang do not have much equity capital, usually 
tens of thousands silver, but the scale of deposits and 
loans reaches for million. Which is unusually easily 
misunderstood by bankers. In fact, whether banks 
or Qianzhuang, the main source of operating funds 
is deposits, not equity. Equity is mainly used to deal 
3 Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank of China. Historical 
materials of Shanghai Qianzhuang. Shanghai People's Publishing 
House, 1978, 152. "Shareholders bear unlimited responsibility 
and pay in advance as soon as necessary. Capital is limited, but 
responsibility is infinite.
with credit crisis and to cash depositors in the event of 
bankruptcy and liquidation. Banks are limited liability, 
and their equity is their only guarantee of credit to 
depositors. The situation of Qianzhuang is different. 
When a credit crisis occurs, the shareholders of 
Qianzhuang bear unlimited risk liability. Therefore, the 
credit of Qianzhuang to the depositors does not depend 
on the amount of equity, but on the abundance degree of 
shareholders and family background, as well as on the 
operation of property.
In most cases, when Qianzhuang is liquidated at risk, it 
is not insolvency that results in the loss of the depositor’s 
capital, but repayment by shareholders. In this regard, 
Qianzhuang can be regarded as a model of traditional 
business circles, plenty of shareholders., after a year or 
two of closure, still insist on paying Qianzhuang’s debts. 
As long as there is still a little possibility, they will never 
lose Qianzhuang’s credit to depositors.
The shareholders of Qianzhuang bear unlimited 
liabilities for the debts of Qianzhuang. That is to say, 
if there is a problem in the operation of Qianzhuang, 
the debts  of  Qianzhuang wil l  be distr ibuted by 
the shareholders according to their shares, and the 
shareholders will be fully responsible for the debts. If 
there is a problem in Qianzhuang, the shareholders will 
pay immediately. In this way, the credit of Qianzhuang 
is mainly guaranteed by the credit of the shareholders, 
not by the amount of equity invested by the shareholders. 
Therefore, judging the strength and credibility of a 
Qianzhuang in society does not only depend on its total 
equity, but also on the whole family and personal credit 
of its shareholders. The stronger the financial resources of 
shareholders and the more prominent their reputation in 
the business world, the stronger their banking power will 
be.
“Therefore,  the establishment of Qianzhuang 
reputation does not depend entirely on the amount 
of capital, but mainly on: a. all the property credit of 
shareholders, that also is the credit of Qianzhuang, b. 
when shareholders invest in Qianzhuang, there must be a 
considerable amount of deposits in Qianzhuang4. 
The more powerful capitalists in the society, besides 
Qianzhuang they invest in, choose another Qianzhuang 
with good reputation at the end of March or September of 
the Old Calendar to deposit in a six-month fixed deposit 
with a slightly lower interest rate than the general deposit, 
which is called “inner plate”. In this way, shareholders 
have a considerable amount of time deposits in different 
Qianzhuang, which are spread among Qianzhuang, 
and gradually form the image of a solid capitalist. In 
addition, in order to improve the reputation and expand 
the reputation, “the prestigious relatives and friends can 
4 Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank of China. Historical 
materials of Shanghai Qianzhuang. Shanghai People's Publishing 
House, 1978, 460
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raise money for listing on the first day. In the money 
market, they can open up large amounts of loans to 
show that they have sufficient capital and are flexible in 
hand”5. This greatly increases the depositor’s confidence 
in Qianzhuang, greatly reduces the risk of runs and 
eliminates instability.
4 .   T H E  E F F E C T I v E N E S S  O F 
R I S K  C O N T R O L M E C H A N I S M  O F 
QIANZHUANG
4.1  Reliability and Rationality of Personnel 
System
a. Supervision of managers. Managers have great 
responsibilities and centralized power. If this is the case, 
then there must be a corresponding system to check and 
balance managers. There are two ways for Shanghai 
Qianzhuang to do this. One is to actively restrain the 
behavior. That is to set up positions for supervision within 
Qianzhuang on the basis of expressing trust in managers, 
so as to supervise and balance the managers. Second, 
negative restraint behavior, that is some restraint effect 
which existing as some customs in the Money Industry 
Association on managers. 
The year-end closing system is one of them. Every 
new business year, shareholders are free to decide 
whether to withdraw their shares before opening. In 
fact, this is somewhat similar to the modern corporate 
system of “voting with feet” approach, in order to 
restrain the behavior of managers. In addition, in order 
to make managers loyal, shareholders also let managers 
participate in dividend distribution or public investment as 
incentives, so that the Qianzhuang manager’s interests and 
shareholders’ interests are linked together.
b. Manager’s robustness. Typical example is Qin 
Runqing6, a tumbler in Shanghai’s money industry. Qin 
Runqing, a native of Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, was 
an apprentice in Shanghai Qianzhuang since he was 
a teenager, and then the manager (or supervisor) of a 
wealthy Suzhou man’s Qianzhuang. He has made four 
Qianzhuang top in Shanghai’s money industry, and he has 
also become the head of Shanghai’s money industry. He 
has served as the chairman of Shanghai Money Industry 
Association for consecutive 15 years.
 In the past decades when he serves as the chairman, 
the money industry in Shanghai has experienced five or 
six large-scale financial upsurges, including the rubber 
storm (1910), the 1911 Revolution (1911), the Xinjiao 
storm (1921), the scrapping of silver to yuan (1931). In 
5 Liu Meiying, Research on the Internal Control System and Control 
Mechanism of Shanghai Qianzhuang, Business Research, No. 409, 
2011/05
6 Sun Shangen, Zhou Xiaosheng: Collection of Qin Runqing's 
Historical Materials, Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009
the case of a large number of Qianzhuang being dragged 
down by bad debts, Qin’s four Qianzhuang have survived 
from all those upsurges, and after the upsurge, Qin’s 
banking business was even stronger.
For Qin Runqing’s professional experience, the first 
is to be steady. The key to stability is prudence. To begin 
with, there are roughly several levels: first, for each loan, 
they must carefully check the ability and morality of 
shareholders and managers of lenders, check their personal 
privacy, and their credit, and then have a comprehensive 
understanding of the operation of the business, the use of 
loans, and the quality of the market. Therefore, when he 
ran the street in Qianzhuang, he didn’t let a bill go back. 
Secondly, the overall structure of lending should be 
decentralized and the eggs are not put in one basket. 
Thirdly, the overall scale of lending should not be greedily 
concerned. That is to say, always keep the balance of 
money within means, so that not to borrow from other 
Qianzhuang, let alone borrow funds from other banks, 
so as to avoid checks and balances from other financial 
institutions. Fourthly, the type of lending should not be 
speculative businesses, should not be tempted by high 
interest rates, or not engage in high-risk loans. However, 
for well-targeted business projects, to boldly lend money, 
regardless of short-term risks, and achieve win-win long-
term cooperation.
The above lending principles have greatly reduced 
the risk of loans, and thus Qin Runqing’s Qianzhuang 
passed smoothly in the turbulence of financial turmoil. It 
is generally understood that businessmen are greedy, but 
in fact, businessmen have their own ways. In Historical 
Records, it is said that, greedy businessmen have high 
profits and can recover their principal in three years. 
Businessmen who are not greedy avoid risks and make 
lower profits, so it takes five years to recover costs. The 
development of honest businessmen is slow but steady. 
Especially for the financial industry, the risk is high, and 
it is easy to spread or be affected by others.
It should be pointed out that the stability of managers 
is not only a policy and strategy of risk control, but 
also the moral faith of managers to shareholders. In the 
traditional banking industry, the identity stock system 
is generally implemented, that is a typical Chinese 
style. Identity stock is a Profit Dividend system. When 
Qianzhuang makes profits, the manager can share the 
dividend. When Qianzhuang loses money, especially 
when it is liquidated, all the debt losses are borne by the 
shareholders. Qianzhuang is typically highly indebted, 
with a capital-to-debt ratio of tens of times. In case of a 
run, shareholders are required to compensate with their 
own lives. When the debt reversal occurs, the debts can 
not be repaid (for Qianzhuang the goal of debt recovery is 
scattered, and those debtors may indeed be no money), but 
depositors of Qianzhuang would hardly push Qianzhuang 
(for depositors the goal of debt recovery is obvious 
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and concentrated), together with the support of the 
government, a wealthy family shareholder, within several 
days, may ruin all fortune and become a street beggar.
Therefore, the management of managers is to take 
the lives of shareholders in the game, the responsibility 
is heavy, naturally there is a high sense of moral 
responsibility. Lending is the source of the risk of the 
bank. As the loan is steady and the risk is greatly reduced, 
the key to the risk control of the bank is grasped.
c. Personnel selection system. Qianzhuang has a strong 
family style about personnel arrangement. The selection 
of shareholders, managers and even apprentices is based 
on the tradition of “consanguinity, kinship, geographic 
and professional affinity”, which we call “pan-family” 
relationship network. It is precisely because of this 
family-like personnel mechanism, so that Qianzhuang 
with less rigorous internal control system have reduced 
the occurrence of internal risks. 
For example, if managers are not personally held by 
shareholders, they are mostly selected from the three-
year-old Qianzhuang apprentices or other employees, 
and most of them have “pan-family” relationships with 
shareholders. There is also a strong pan-family tendency 
in the appointment of other positions in Qianzhuang, 
such as recruiting apprentices, introducing relatives and 
friends, training exchange students, etc. Through this 
family personnel system, the bankers are not only doing a 
job, but also standing for the family.
4.2  Prudence in Qianzhuang’s Banking Business
a. Do not arbitrarily expand the scale of deposits. The 
deposit of Qianzhuang is the main source of Qianzhuang’s 
fund operation, which roughly includes personal 
deposit and current deposit. For personal savings, the 
shareholders generally have to deposit a large sum of 
money in Qianzhuang for the purpose of operation. For 
other deposits, depositors and managers have personal 
relationships to some extent. Current deposits, in fact, are 
deposits of business people. Businessmen borrow money 
from Qianzhuang and deposit money in Qianzhuang when 
they have surplus funds.
It is worth noting that Qianzhuang do not accept 
deposits at will, nor do they expand deposits at will like 
modern western banks. First, do not accept deposits from 
strangers, but only deposits from acquaintances. First, 
they are afraid of unknown origin, such as stolen money; 
second, acquaintances will not withdraw their savings 
at will, resulting in Qianzhuang’s shortfall. When there 
are rumors on the market, it is also easy to work with 
depositors and not easy to run. Second, they are unwilling 
to expand their deposits at will because they are afraid of 
imposing additional burdens on shareholders. Because 
when faced with a possible run, shareholders have to pay 
in advance first, and when closing down, shareholders 
have to pay cash to depositors. If the deposit plate is large, 
the scale of lending is large, and the amount of risk of 
external backing is large, the shareholders may not be able 
to compensate for the loss of property.
b. Strict regulations on negotiable instruments. 
For example, when Shunkang Qianzhuang receives 
Hongsheng Qianzhuang’s bill, the first thing to do is 
to send the old secretary or apprentice to Hongsheng 
Qianzhuang to check the bill. When delivering tickets, he 
holds a bill return book, which indicates the number of 
bills. After checking by the important staff of Hongsheng 
Qianzhuang, he confirms that there is no problem with 
the ticket. In order to prove this, Hongsheng Qianzhuang 
stamps on the left or right corner of the ticket. Once a 
ticket has been passed, the issuer must cash it when it 
matures.
“The relationship between Qianzhuang is very 
credible. Whoever holds Qianzhuang’s note is regarded 
as cash.” 7That is to say, the cashing of Qianzhuang’s bill 
is a “promissory non-recognizer”. However, in 1906, the 
regulations of the North and South city money industry 
reorganization stipulated that when Qianzhuang tickets 
expired, if people who did not know came to cash, they 
would not pay until 12:00 p.m. in accordance with the 
general rules of the money market. If the bill is discounted 
as an unexpired one, all of them need to be carefully 
identified.”
Reporting loss then stopping payment. In fact, 
there may be tickets loss, because of theft and so on. If 
Qianzhuang pays the bill at sight, it will cause losses to 
the customers. But if Qianzhuang stop paying with no 
conclusive fact, it will easily cause losses to the credit of 
Qianzhuang. Therefore, Qianzhuang has made detailed 
provisions on the situation of suspension of payment 
of tickets by reporting the loss of tickets. “when the 
dealer come to Qianzhuang with the intention to ask for 
suspension of payment by reporting loss, if the ticket has 
been paid, or has been used to buy goods, or has been 
discounted, and there are accounts to be recorded, and 
goods to be pointed out, then we can be sure that ticket 
entries into others’ hands, or is stolen by self-theft, or 
there are other situations, no matter when, Qianzhuang 
shall not agree to any suspension of payment by reporting 
the loss of the ticket.”8
If the ticket is truly lost because of theft, water or fire, 
the person who losses the ticket must issue a certificate, 
apply to Qianzhuang for suspension of payment of loss, 
and declare in the famous newspapers at home and abroad 
that the ticket is invalid, at the same time, report to the 
local government, so as to suspend payment temporarily. 
And the money is immediately sent to the guild for 
safekeeping, after 100 days, if there is no dispute, the 
loser can find a solid guarantor, or a solid firm name, issue 
7 "Shanghai Money Business Rules" (revised in January 1920), 
upscale S174-1-11. Article 13, paragraph B.
8 Pan Liangui, The History of Shanghai Money (Second Edition), 
Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2015.
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a guarantee, and then the loser would get the payment; 
if it is found that there are other disputes, the request of 
suspension of payment is not valid.
5.  THE PREvENTIvE FUNCTION OF 
MONEy INDUSTRy ASSOCIATION ON 
INTER-INDUSTRy FINANCIAL RISKS
Financial risk has strong inter-industry transmission, like 
infectious diseases. Therefore, for Qianzhuang, many 
risks may come from the inter-industry. Therefore, there 
is a strong demand for mutual assistance and internal 
self-discipline in the banking industry, and the Money 
Industry Association is such an organization for mutual 
assistance and self-discipline in the banking industry. In 
traditional Chinese society, the number of Qianzhuang is 
more than ten even in a ordinary city, there usually exists 
Money Industry Association within the scope of the city. 
The Money Industry Association can be regarded as a 
special organization to guard against industry-specific 
financial risks. The purpose of the establishment of the 
Money Industry Association is to strengthen management, 
seek the security of financial circulation and transactions, 
safeguard the interests of the money industry and promote 
the development of the money industry.
5.1  Setting up Barriers to Entry to Prevent 
vicious Competition
a. The Money Industry Association has the right to set 
qualifications for entry into the industry. The strength of 
Shanghai Money Industry Association is the strongest. 
As early as the Qianlong Dynasty, the Money Industry 
Association of Shanghai was established. There are two 
main reasons why the Money Industry Association has the 
power to set qualifications for entry into the industry:
The first is the “public facilities” function of the 
Money Industry Association, including the interbank 
remittance function and the interbank lending market. If 
the new entries can not become members of the guild, 
they will naturally be shielded from the exchange and 
lending markets of the money industry. It is difficult for 
them to start business, or they can only become small 
Qianzhuang. In addition, members of the association have 
high social credit, easy access to deposits, and easy access 
to customers. In a word, it is difficult to carry out business 
without joining the association.
The second is the support of local governments. 
Because the money industry deeply involves in the local 
financial stability, local governments cannot ignore it. 
Therefore, in the late Qing Dynasty, local governments 
often required to submit applications for the establishment 
of Qianzhuang. The function of examination is handed 
over to the Money Industry Association. With the support 
of the government, the guild naturally has real power. 
In some small towns, there are few Qianzhuang and no 
association, so the relevant functions can only be assumed 
by the government. However, because the government 
does not understand the actual situation, the effect of the 
review is greatly reduced.
b. The direct procedure for setting entry threshold 
by the guild is peer recommendation and qualification 
examination of applicants. Its main focus is two 
considerations: first, whether the shareholders are well-
educated, whether they have the ability to assume 
unlimited risk liability; and, how about ethics and 
qualifications of managers they appoint. According to 
such censorship standards, it is naturally easy to screen 
out abusers and even some speculative fraudsters. In 
historical materials, we can see that in some small towns 
without money guilds, there are sometimes fraudsters who 
run Qianzhuang, absorb enough savings and then roll up 
the money to escape.
Second is to consider the supply and demand situation 
of the industry and not allow the number of members to 
expand too much, leading to serious vicious competition 
within the inter-industry. One of the major reasons for the 
inadvertent operation of the money industry is vicious 
competition. In Shanghai’s money industry, we can see 
that the riskier means of operation are often used by 
newly established Qianzhuang, who are eager to stand on 
their feet. Imagine that if the industry is too crowded, or 
even leading to vicious competition, it will be even more 
inevitable that there will be speculative risk-taking in the 
whole industry, and ultimately bring significant risks to 
the whole industry.9
5.2  Establish Intra-City Remittance and Lending 
Markets to Finance Each Other
Interbank remittance is originally used to support 
banknotes issued by Qianzhuang. But it differs from 
modern banknotes in which its credit does not come 
from the credit of state power, but from the function of 
convertible metal coins (silver). It not only saves the 
amount of money in circulation, but also facilitates the 
cross-regional trade of businessmen.
However, due to the lack of local Qianzhuang 
semicolons. Therefore, the convenient way of circulation 
is to admit and accept the banknotes of other Qianzhuang 
in different places or in the same city. In this way, there 
must be a place for exchange and debit. The Shanghai 
Money Industry Association has long invented this kind 
of exchange system, which makes the bill play its scale 
effect, which is equivalent to expanding the operating 
funds of Qianzhuang, similar to the so-called monetary 
multiplier effect of commercial banks in modern banking 
science.
As a result of the transfer and rolling of accounts, 
9 There are many similar cases all over the country. See Modern 
Chinese Economic History (1927-1937), edited by Liu Kexiang and 
Wu Taichang, 2010 edition, P1996-1997.
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there must be imbalances in expenditures, some need to 
pay the cash, and some need to recover the cash. When 
a Qianzhuang’s existing cash is insufficient to pay its 
arrears, it naturally requires short-term borrowing. So, 
the guild set up the interbank lending market and provide 
adjustment. This enables the banks to obtain the buffer 
space of insufficient money through the lending market, 
which naturally plays a very convenient role in the daily 
operation of Qianzhuang.
5.3  Establ ish Internal  Rules to Prevent 
Risk Behaviors of Some Qianzhuang From 
Endangering Group Interests
With the power of managing the inter-industry, it is 
natural to specify internal competition rules and uniform 
business ethics. For example, in terms of deposit and 
loan, the most common provision is the agreement on 
deposit and loan interest rates, which can greatly prevent 
vicious competition among the industry. Where there is no 
money guild, it is easy to compete among Qianzhuang, or 
among Qianzhuang gangs, to hold high interest rates and 
to lend at low interest rates, which leads to uncontrolled 
competition and financial risks in the whole industry.
At the same time, the Money Industry Association has 
also formulated numerous norms. Some are moral advice, 
others are rules, and once violated, severe sanctions will 
be imposed. For example, the Shanghai Money Industry 
Association, which has the most stringent rules, once 
stipulated that the associates of the members of the 
association should not participate in the brokerage of the 
credit exchange or in the trading of stocks, and once found 
out, those who participate should be severely punished. 
This is mainly aimed at preventing the prevailing 
speculation on the Shanghai Credit Exchange in the 1920s 
(the credit tide) from causing great harm to Qianzhuang.
CONCLUSION
Credit loans are implemented by Qianzhuang in order 
to meet the objective needs of local businesses. When 
lending, Qianzhuang pay great attention to credit 
investigation, relying on the geographic relationship 
and personal contacts with the merchants to ensure 
the accuracy of the survey information, and the whole 
business circle also cherishes commercial credit. These 
factors make the risk of credit loans controllable. For 
the risk of runs, Qianzhaung take precautions through 
daily balance of revenue and expenditure, cross-bank 
dismantling and unlimited risk liability of shareholders.
In the whole Qianzhuang system, managers act very 
steadily. Qin Runqing is a typical representative. This is 
not only a policy of risk control, but also the moral faith 
of managers to shareholders. When banks absorb deposits, 
they strive for the stability of depositors and never 
expand at will. These two points strongly guarantee the 
effectiveness of the risk control mechanism of the banking 
industry.
At the same time, the risk of the financial industry has 
a strong inter-industry transmission. As an organization 
of mutual assistance and self-discipline within the 
Qianzhuang industry, the Money Industry Association 
specially guards against the industrial risk. The Money 
Industry Association shall set barriers to entry, prevent 
vicious competition and shield potential harmful ones 
out of the industry; set up inter-city remittance and 
lending markets to accommodate funds; and formulate 
internal plans to prevent someone’s risk behaviors from 
endangering the interests of groups.
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